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RECENT CASES

mental to this study, and to the securities acts coming before it, "was
to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of
caveat emptor." 7 This was done in an attempt to protect the increasing number of people investing in securities.
The decision in the principal case marks a significant advance in
the gradual expansion of the concept of fraud. Although "fraud" shall
remain one of the most ambiguous legal concepts, this decision has
cleared the way for courts to go beyond a technical construction of
the fraud provisions in the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. Courts
maust carefully consider the balance of interests involved in construing
fraud provisions under securities acts. Security dealers in fiduciary
positions maintain an advantage over their clients. To insure a high
standard of ethics in the securities industry, courts must guard against
potential fraud by requiring disclosure of such practices as "scalping."
Leon L. Hollon

CBinNA

LA--HoICmE-INSmU rUoNS.-Defendant was convicted

of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to twenty-one years in
prison. When the offense occurred, defendant was intoxicated and
bleeding from a knife wound in the throat inflicted by the deceased.
Death resulted from the kicking and stomping of the deceased by the
defendant. None of these facts are in dispute. Held: Reversed. The
court ruled that the defendant was entitled to an instruction on involuntary manslaughter since he was intoxicated and there was
extreme provocation. The court further said that even before the
eractment of the new statute' dividing involuntary manslaughter into
two degrees, an instruction on involuntary manslaughter would have
been necessary. Lambert v. Commonwealth, 377 S.W.2d 76 (Ky.
1964).
There are several aspects of this case which are worthy of some
comment. First is the statement by the court that the instruction on
involuntary manslaughter should have been given under the law as it
stood before the new statute.
2
The leading case on this subject is Maulding v. Commonwealth.
In that case the defendant was convicted of willful murder when he
kicked and stomped his victim to death. The court said that due to
the excessive brutality of the acts it could not be doubted that the
17 See H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1932).
1Ky.
2

Rev. Stat. § 435.022 (1962) [Hereinafter referred to as KRS].

172 Ky. 370, 189 S.W. 251 (1916).
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defendant intended to kill his victim. The court affirmed the judgment
and held that an instruction on involuntary manslaughter was not
necessary.
The opinion in the principal case quotes an example, given in the
Maulding3 case, of where an instruction on involuntary manslaughter
would be necessary. The example given is of a "sudden simple fist
fight." There is no doubt that this is the law. There are many cases
so holding.4 In all of these cases, however, it has been stated as
dictum that the use of excessive force or brutality would give rise to
an inference of an intent to kill. This would take it out of the field of
a sudden simple fist fight and thus not require an instruction on
involuntary manslaughter.
The test of whether an inference of intent to kill would be raised
was based on how certain it was that death would follow from the
acts of the defendant. 5 In the cases which were termed "sudden
simple fist fight," death unexpectedly followed from acts from which
it was not probable that death would result.6 Thus, no inference of
intent to kill was raised. In the Maulding case, the resulting death
was not only probable, but manifestly certain to follow from the
nature of the acts. Therefore, there was an inference of an intent to
kill.
In the principal case, death was just as certain to follow from
the acts of the defendant as the death in the Maulding case. This
appears obvious from the record. There was uncontroverted evidence
that the defendant had jumped up and down with both feet on the
face of the deceased.7 The attack occurred with the deceased unconscious, and the defendant wearing shoes.
The testimony of the coroner is very illuminating in his description
of the injuries of the deceased:
Most of the injury was to the subject's head. He had massive fractures
throughout the left temporal region of his head; hematoma and lacerations of the brain; the left side of his head was disfigured [and] the
contour of his head was bashed in from the beating.
He had fractures of his left cheek and jaw, fractures of his nose. He
had numerous lacerations and abrasions about the head, face, neck,
shoulders and arms.8

From the above evidence it would seem plausible to conclude that
death would probably follow. In fact, the victim was dead on arrival
3
4

Ibid.

White v. Commonwealth, 360 S.W.2d 198 (Ky. 1960), and cases cited

therein.

5 Sikes v. Commonwealth, 304 Ky. 429, 200 S.W.2d 956 (1947).
6 White v. Commonwealth, supra, note 4.
7
8 Transcript of Evidence, page 25, Lambert v. Commonwealth.
Transcript of Evidence, page 3, Lambert v. Commonwealth.
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at the hospital. 9 If ever there was a case of excessive brutality, this
should be one. Therefore, in the opinion of this writer, an inference
of an intent to kill should have arisen. This means that under the law
as it was before the new statute,10 it seems clear that an instruction
on involuntary manslaughter should not be required.
The only factors in the principal case which differ from the
Maulding case are that the defendant was drunk, cut, and bleeding.
This brings us to the second point of comment: should drunkenness
and provocation serve to reduce a crime from murder to involuntary
manslaughter?
Drunkenness, in Kentucky homicide law, has heretofore served to
reduce a crime to voluntary manslaughter where it would otherwise
have been murder." This was rationalized by saying that an intoxicated person could not form the requisite intent, or malice, to be
convicted of murder.' 2 This writer has been unable to find any case
which has allowed drunkenness to reduce a crime from murder to
involuntary manslaughter.
The same has been true of provocation. It generally has served to
reduce a crime from murder to voluntary manslaughter, 3 but not to
involuntary manslaughter. In fact, an intent to do the act seems to be
a prerequisite for allowing provocation to mitigate.
Since neither of these two factors alone is enough to reduce to
involuntary manslaughter, it is difficult to see how the combined
effects of them could do so. When two elements of intentional conduct are added together, the result cannot become unintentional.
The decision in the principal case was based largely on the new
involuntary manslaughter statute, KRS 435.022. This statute provides
for two degrees of involuntary manslaughter. The second degree is
the same as the old common law offense.' 4 The first degree, however,
is a new offense. It was created to do away with the "impossible"
crime of negligent voluntary manslaughter. In effect, it simply takes
the old offense of negligent voluntary manslaughter and changes the
name to involuntary manslaughter in the first degree. This does
away with the self-contradiction in the terms "negligent" and "voluntary." A look at the wording of the statute shows that negligence is
what the drafters of the statute had in mind. It defines involuntary
1bid.
10 KRS 435.022 (1962).

11Henson v. Commonwealth, 314 S.W.2d 197 (Ky. 1958), Richardson v.

Commonwealth, 284 Ky. 319, S.W.2d 492 (1940).

12Ibid.
134 Commonwealth v. Beverly, 34 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. 1931).
1 Basically, it is where death results from reckless conduct and was not
intended.
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manslaughter in the first degree as ". . . an act creating such extreme
risk of death as to manifest a wanton indifference to the value of
human life according to the standard of conduct of a reasonable man
".
under the circumstances . ..,5
The opinion in the principal case shows that the court considered
the defendant's acts as falling under the heading of the old negligent
voluntary manslaughter. This is difficult to understand. It is hard
to see how the acts of hitting, beating, kicking, and stomping another
person can be considered negligent. It was not treated as negligence
in the Maulding case; There it was considered willful murder.
This writer has been unable to find any case which treated these
elements as belonging in the negligence field. While the purpose of
this statute must be commended, it is suggested that this case does
not fit within the class of negligence, and thus does not call for any
consideration of the statute.
There is one further point of interest in this case. The court
defined the word "wanton" as it is to be used in the first degree of KRS
435.022.
A wanton act is a dangerous act, done on purpose, in complete disregard
of the rights of others. The actor must have conscious knowledge of the
probable consequences and a complete disregard for them. 16

It is suggested that this definition is not adequate to allow a jury
to distinguish between the crimes of willful murder and involuntary
manslaughter. Any intentional homicide would be a wanton act,
under this definition. The jury could very easily find a person guilty
of involuntary manslaughter in the first degree when he has deliberately shot another in the head and killed him. This would result in
what we could call the "intentional involuntary manslaughter" rule to
take the place of the negligent voluntary manslaughter. Then we
would need another statute to do away with this equally impossible
crime. Then a case interpreting... AD infinitum.
Vernon G. Lewter

CONSTrITTONAL LAw-DUE PRocEss-AicnSSION To PRACrICE-HEAiRINGS BEFORE COMIM=TEES ON CHARAcrER AND FrrNms.-In 1936 the

New York State Board of Bar Examiners certified that petitioner had
passed the state's bar examinations. In 1938, after several hearings,

the state's Committee on Character and Fitness refused to certify that
156 KRS 435.022(1).
1 Lambert v. Commonwealth, 377 S.W.2d 76 (Ky. 1964).

